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3INTRODUCTION
Suspicions over pharmaceutical ethics in an exclusively profit based industry have 
surfaced once again.  This time is the victim Merck & Co., Inc. (“Merck”) or is it the twenty 
million Americans who filled their prescriptions for Vioxx? Plaintiff attorney Mark Lainer’s 
opening statement, in the first publicized trial in Brazoria County Texas state court, described the 
company’s drug safety policy as “Murky Ethics.”  The thousands of personal injury cases filed
after Merck’s voluntary withdrawal of Vioxx appear difficult to prove.  A large obstacle for 
plaintiffs is the admissibility of epidemiologic studies, which are required to prove specific 
causation.  Despite considerable obstacles, the sex appeal of these cases is too enticing for the 
litigation savvy.  If plaintiffs can at least get the case to make it to a jury, then the odds are that 
some will be successful with likely large awards, possibly including punitive damages.
Pharmaceutical companies spend countless hours and resources developing and 
researching new drugs.  While considering America’s health concerns, companies direct most of 
their attention towards medical problems that have a greater population to market to, or most 
importantly, ones that will generate the most revenue.  Once a drug is initially developed and the 
corporation believes it to be a profitable venture, trials of drugs begin in the lab and then 
clinically in order to gain regulatory approval.3 In order for a drug to be approved for sale in the
U.S. the drugs must endure the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) three-step approval 
process.4
3
 Food and Drug Administration, The New Drug Approval Process: Steps from Test Tube to New Application 
Review, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/develop.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2005).  This clickable 
diagram explains the process each drug endures in the approval process.
4 Id.
4FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
The FDA falls under the direction of the Department of Health and Human Services.  
Overly simplified, the FDA process is one comparing the risks and side effects of a drug to the 
benefit one receives from taking it. In making these decisions, the FDA takes into account the 
significance of a targeted health condition, or the status of that condition as a treatable disease.5
If a product has not received marketing approval (or an exemption) from the agency, then the 
drug cannot be sold. Even if a company has surmounted the often difficult hurdle of proving that 
a product serves a therapeutic purpose without posing an undue risk, the FDA’s decisions about 
appropriate labeling may affect how readily patients will be able to use it.6
On average, the estimated cost from design to approval in 2000 dollars is $802 million.7
The expected cost of developing the average HIV/AIDS drug is $479 million; however, the 
expected cost of developing the average rheumatoid arthritis drug is close to double at $936
million.8  The difference in cost is attributable to the necessity and speed that AIDS drugs need
to get to otherwise terminally ill patients.
DIRECT TO CONSUMER MARKETING
Historically, pharmaceutical companies developed and directed their entire product 
marketing, promotion, and education to physicians and health care providers responsible for 
prescribing the manufacturer’s products. 9  Realizing the profit potential, drug companies now 
5
 Noah Lars, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Technologies, 31 J. L. Med. & Ethics 55 
(Spring 2003).
6 Id. 
7
 Christopher Adams, Estimating the Costs of New Drug Development: Is it really $802m? (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=640563#PaperDownload.
8 Id.
9
 Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System:  How Pioneer Drug Makers Exploit the Law to 
Maintain Monopoly Power in the Prescription Drug Market, 29 J. Legis. 21, 40 (2002).
5provide direct-to-consumer advertising to the public in an effort to increase profits and market 
share.10
Upjohn Co. became the first drug manufacturer to advertise directly to consumers when it 
advertised for Rogaine, a hair-loss treatment.11  From 1995 to 1996 drug companies increased 
advertising directed to consumers by ninety percent.12  Many ads aimed at consumers were 
lacking in some manner and did not give the consumer sufficient understanding of the associated 
risks of using the drug.13  The massive direct advertising campaign continued in the early 1990’s, 
with marketing directed towards women, instead of their doctors, concerning the Norplant™
birth control system.14  These recent developments have provoked FDA response.
Merck is one of the five largest pharmaceutical companies in the world.15 Company sales 
totaled nearly $23 billion in 2003.16 Vioxx was heavily marketed in the U.S. and 80 countries 
worldwide.17 The company spent over $100 million annually in direct-to-consumer advertising 
on Vioxx alone.18 The drug became an instant blockbuster with physicians writing over one 
hundred million prescriptions, twenty million users, and raking in roughly $2.5 billion in
Merck’s annual sales.19
10 Id.
11 Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999) citing Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking 
Behavioralism Seriously:  Some Evidence of Marketing Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 1456 (1999).
12 Id. 
13 Hanson, supra note 11.
14 In Re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 215 F. Supp. 2d 795 (D.C.E.D. Tex. 2002).
15 Prescription For Trouble, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 14, 2004 available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/14/60minutes/main655577.shtml.
16 Id.
17
 Merck & Co. Inc., Merck Announces Voluntary Worldwide Withdrawal of VIOXX (Sept 30, 2004), available at
http://www.vioxx.com/vioxx/documents/english/vioxx_press_release.pdf.
18
 Eric J. Topol, Good Riddance to a Bad Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2004, at A15.
19
 Dustin R. Marlowe, Note: A dose of reality for §6(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 39 
Ga. L. Rev. 1445 (Summer, 2005).
6Merck’s success with Vioxx paralleled Pfizer’s COX-II inhibitors, Celebrex and Bextra.20
The success of all three drugs was attributable to their apparent ability to satisfy the best of both 
possible worlds, relieving pain without provoking the risk of stomach or intestinal bleeding 
inherent to ibuprofen and similar drugs.21 The cost of a COX-II specific drug is far greater than 
original non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (“NSAIDs”) such as aspirin.22  Vioxx costs a few 
dollars a day while aspirin is only a few pennies.23  Vioxx was not intended to be taken as often 
(once a day) compared to other NSAIDs (two or more times a day);24 so while Vioxx is more 
convenient the greater cost may outweigh the convenience of the dosage.
WHAT IS VIOXX?
Rofecoxib (“Vioxx”) received FDA approval in 1999 for sale in the U.S.25  The drug’s 
intended uses at the time of approval was for reduction of pain and inflammation caused by 
osteoarthritis, acute pain, and menstrual pain.26  The drug was subsequently approved to treat 
rheumatoid arthritis in adults and children. 27   Rheumatoid arthritis is a chronic syndrome 
characterized by inflammation in the lining of the joints, causing pain, stiffness, warmth, redness, 
20 Aaron Smith, ‘Me-too’ drugs can rake in sales: Copycats like Lipitor can make billions, or fail like Vioxx and 
Bextra. CNN (July, 28, 2005), available at http://money.cnn.com/2005/07/27/news/fortune500/metoo/index.htm; 
See also, Richard A. Epstein, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Cost: An American Dilemma: Regulatory Paternalism 
in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 741, 742 (Summer, 
2005).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.  The original NSAIDs are not isoform specific and inhibit both COX enzymes which is later explained in 
greater detail.  Some examples include aspirin (Bayer), naproxen (Aleve), and ibuprofen (Advil).  To date many 
(including those listed) of the original NSAIDs are over-the-counter medications (“OTC”) which do not require the 
prescription. All COX-II selective drugs are only obtainable by prescription. 
24 Id.
25
 Prescription for Trouble, supra note 15.
26
 Marlowe, supra note 19.
27 Id.
7and swelling, leading to pain and loss of movement.28  Osteoarthritis, or degenerative joint 
disease, is characterized by the breakdown of the cartilage that cushions the ends of bones.29 The 
cartilage breakdown at the joints causes the bones to rub against each other, leading to pain and 
loss of movement.30
Vioxx is in a class of drugs called NSAIDs.31 NSAIDs represent peripherally acting 
analgesics.32  They work by blocking the production of prostaglandins, which are hormone-like 
chemicals that are released in the body in response to injury.33  The prostaglandins are what 
cause inflammation, redness, swelling, pain, and fever.34  Reducing the amount of prostaglandins 
reduces inflammation and its symptoms.35  In order to inhibit production of prostaglandins, the 
NSAIDs act by blocking the enzyme cyclooxygenase (“COX”).36 After further study scientists 
discovered that the COX enzyme has two isoforms, one associated with inflammation (COX-II) 
and another thought to protect the lining of the stomach (COX-I).37  Older NSAIDs blocked both 
isoforms, which may explain their connection to development of ulcers.38
Like other drugs in the same class as Vioxx, the COX-II designation was believed to 
signify a welcomed measure of specificity.  Drugs in this class could work effectively in pain 
management while being friendlier on the stomach than original NSAIDs.
28
 Randall W. King and Richard Worthington, Arthritis, Rheumatoid (last modified April 8, 2005), available at
http://www.emedicine.com/emerg/topic48.htm.
29
 Gregory Stacy and Auveek Pat Basu, Osteoarthritis, Primary (last modified Nov. 4, 2005), available at 
http://www.emedicine.com/radio/topic492.htm.
30
 Id.
31
 Lars, supra note 5.
32
 Analgesics relieve pain without causing the loss of consciousness.
33
 Lars, supra note 5.
34 Id.
35
 Corinne de Vires, Cox-II inhibitors versus non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs in rheumatoid and osteoarthritis 
patients: gastrointestinal effects.  STEER 2002; Vol. 2: No. 8 (2001), available at
http://www.wihrd.soton.ac.uk/projx/signpost/steers/STEER_2002(8).pdf.Steer. 
36 Id.
37 Id. 
38
 Lars, supra note 5; Inhibiting COX-I is thought to inhibit the production of mucosa of the inner lining of the 
stomach and therefore leaves the lining unprotected from irritation leading to ulcers. 
8WHAT HAPPENED?
Clinical research began to indicate that there may be an increase in adverse 
cardiovascular (“CV”) side effects associated with Vioxx.  In February 1997, top company 
scientist, Alise Reicin, wrote an internal email that read “the possibility of increased CV events 
is of great concern.”39  She also wrote that the concern of these results may “kill” the drug.40
Company employees and their consultants published several papers in medical journals rebutting 
studies reporting Vioxx’s heart attack risk.  Merck dismissed these studies, citing poor clinical 
study design and inadequate data.  However, Merck did not engage in research to rebut the 
allegations.
In February 2001, the FDA consulted its Arthritis Advisory Committee regarding the 
clinical interpretation and found COX-II inhibitors potentially have a beneficial anti-
atherogenic41 effect by reducing inflammation.  Inflammation is also an important contributor to 
heart attacks and strokes.
On September 17, 2001, the director of the FDA Division of Drug Marketing, 
Advertising, and Communications, issued a “Warning Letter” to the President and CEO of 
Merck relating to promotional activities and materials for the marketing of Vioxx.42 The letter 
stated that Merck’s promotional campaign discounted the facts of an epidemiological study
(VIGOR).  The results of this study showed a correlation between patients taking Vioxx and a 
four to five fold increase in myocardial infarctions43 compared to patients taking naproxen.44  A 
39
 Heather Tosoriero, et. al., Merck Loss Jolts Drug Giant, Industry, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2005, at A1.
40
 Anna Mathews and Scott Hensley, Medical Journal Says Merck Study Omitted Data, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2005, 
at A6. 
41
 Anti-atherogenic properties help to prevent formation of plaques in the arteries.
42
 Thomas W. Abrams, Warning Letter, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Sept. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/forms/vioxx_longform_exhibb_111303.pdf.
43
 Acute myocardial infarction (AMI) is the rapid development of myocardial necrosis (death of heart muscle tissue) 
caused by a critical imbalance between the oxygen supply and demand of the myocardium.   More information 
available at http://www.emedicine.com/EMERG/topic327.htm.
9few months later Merck changed product labeling to include the results of this study.  However, 
Merck had such confidence in the ability of Vioxx that the company sought to expand the 
portfolio of permissible uses by raising the dosage to determine the effectiveness of Vioxx in 
treating polyps.45  During this trial Merck discovered an apparent increase in the number of 
adverse CV occurrences.46
On September 30, 2004, Merck announced that it would voluntarily pull Vioxx from the 
market.  Withdrawal occurred before FDA demand.  The decision to remove the drug from the 
market was widely read as a fatal admission of dangerous conduct by a company that should 
never have launched the drug in the first place.  The veritable firestorm of reactions included the 
anticipated onslaught of ordinary tort actions for personal injuries, congressional investigations, 
inquiries by the SEC, derivative actions, suits for refunds, internal inquiries and so forth.47
Merck’s shares lost $12 from $45.07 to $33 the day it announced Vioxx’s removal, only to 
stabilize in the $29-$33 range thereafter.48 On November 2, 2004, Merck’s stock tumbled 10% 
after the media reported that the company hid data regarding Vioxx from the FDA.49
On a larger scale, one wonders if the drug industry’s tolerance for incomplete data is 
reflective of an industry preference for marketing drugs based on profitability rather than effects.  
Would the drug companies be so tolerant of incomplete financial data on their drugs?    Fingers 
are being pointed everywhere, hoping to find someone to blame.  Dr. David Graham, an FDA 
scientist, put the blame on the FDA saying the agency overvalues the benefits of the drugs it 
44
 Debabrata Mukherjee, et. al., Risk of Cardiovascular Events Associated With Selective Cox-2 Inhibitors, J.A.M.A. 
286:8, 954-959, (Aug. 22, 2001).  See also, Abrams, supra note 41.  
45
 Polyps are intestinal growths that may become cancerous.
46 Robert Bresalier, Cardiovascular Events with Rofecoxib in Colorectal Adenoma Chemoprevention Trial, NEJM 
(March 17, 2005), Issue 352, 1092-1102.  See also, Epstein, supra note 20, at 742.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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approves and seriously undervalues drug safety.50  As the CV side effects became increasingly 
apparent, Merck and the FDA engaged in a tug of war over the label’s language.  
On December 17, 2004 Pfizer announced that one of two clinical studies on Celebrex, 
another COX-II, revealed that it presented an elevated risk of heart attacks.51  There is a strong 
suspicion as more research is completed that the cardiac events may affect the entire class of 
COX-II drugs.52 In 2002, Merck withdrew its FDA application for another COX-II drug the 
company was developing called Arcoxia. 53  This represented Merck’s first application removal 
in ten years.54 Pfizer has not removed Celebrex from the market, but has since stopped consumer 
advertising.55
On February 18, 2005, the FDA created an advisory panel to look into concerns related to 
Vioxx.  The panel recommended allowing doctors to prescribe Vioxx provided the product came 
with a strong warning for special need cases.56 The panel decided that the arthritis drugs’ 
benefits outweighed the risks of heart problems and strokes but suggested the products carry 
strong warnings.  The FDA is not bound by the panel’s findings.  At this point Merck has not 
lobbied the FDA to return the drug to market. Physicians have attempted to explain why there 
50 See, Philip J. Hilts, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA; BUSINESS; AND 100 YEARS OF REGULATION. 
(2003).
51
 FE Silverstein, et. al., Gastrointestinal toxicity with celcoxib vs nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs for 
osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis: the CLASS study: A randomized controlled trial. Celecoxib Long-term 
Arthritis Safety Study, JAMA (2000), Vol. 284, Issue 10, 1247-55.
52
 Andrew Pollack, New Scrutiny of Drugs in Vioxx’s Family, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004, at C1; Rod Winslow, Heart 
Risk Is Seen In Class of Drugs For a Host of Ills, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2005, at B4.
53
 Forbes, Bad News: Merck Withdraws Arcoxia Application (March 15, 2005), available at
www.forbes.com/2002/03/15/0315mrk.html; see also, In re Merck & Co., Inc., 150 S.W.3d 747 (Tex. App. 2004).
54 Id.
55
 Amy Tsao.  Big Changes for Big Pharma (January 3, 2005). available at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2005/nf2005013_7406_db037.htm; see also, Epstein, supra note 
20.
56
 The strongest warning, as here, called a “Black Box Warning,” which is of certain size located on the front of the 
box visible to all users that addresses a specific warning.
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may be an increased CV risk with Vioxx.57  The role of COX enzymes in the body is clearly not 
fully understood and there is evidence that COX-I has thrombotic effects (helps promote blood 
clotting).  Blocking COX-II and not COX-I could tip the balance in favor of clotting.58
On March 1, 2005 the FDA, in response to overwhelming criticism, lobbied congress to 
be empowered to write warning labels for drugs.59 This caused a revisit to how the FDA should 
proceed on matters of withdrawal and recall.  Some observers have criticized the agency for 
approving too many new NSAIDs that offer no particular advantage over existing, and typically 
less expensive drugs in the class. 60   The FDA usually does not make judgments about 
comparative efficacy, preferring to leave that task for physicians and patients based on the 
information supplied in the labeling dictated by agency reviewers.61 On November 9, 2005, the 
FDA made a recommendation that all COX-II drugs carry a boxed warning highlighting GI and 
CV risks.62
On December 8, 2005, the New England Journal of Medicine released an editorial, 
published in the December 29th edition, stating that editors have uncovered what is believed to be 
publishing misconduct.63  Editors allege that authors of the VIGOR study failed to publish the 
complete findings of patients having adverse CV outcomes. 64   An editor, preparing for 
57
 Yang Chen, et. al., Role of Prostacyclin in the Cardiovascular Response to Thromboxane A2, Journal of Science, 
Vol. 296, pp. 539-541 (Apr. 19, 2002).
58
 Richard Bing and Magdalena, Why Do Cyclo-Oxygenase-2 Inhibitors Cause Cardiovascular Events?, J Am Coll 
Cardiol, Vol. 39 Issue 3, p. 521, 522 (Feb. 6, 2002).
59 Drug Safety; FDA wants power to write warning labels on drugs, CARDIOVASCULAR DEVICE LIABILITY WEEK
(March 27, 2005) at 54.
60
 Epstein, supra note 20.
61
 Lars, supra note 5.
62Federal Drug Administration, COX- 2 Selective (includes Bextra, Celebrex, and Vioxx) and Non-Selective Non-
Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs (NSAIDs), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/COX2/default.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2005).
63
 Gregory Curfman, et. al., Expression of Concern: Bombardier et al., “Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal 
Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis,” N Engl J Med 2000;343:1520-8.
NEJM (2005) Issue 353, 26.
64 Id. 
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deposition, discovered a disk in an envelope submitted with the original article.65 Using a 
tracing feature in the data entry program, Stephen Morrissey, the journal’s managing editor 
found that the disk contained another version of the study results.66  This additional data has been 
explained by the original authors as data which was collected outside of the timeframe of the 
study design.  Even though the non-reported data was not taken during the study timeframe, the 
authors of the study were seen as misleading the scientific community because they knew that 
there was additional data which conflicted with their study’s results.
SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION
Following Vioxx’s withdrawal, an onslaught of lawsuits were filed against Merck.  To
date over 6,500 lawsuits have been filed and the number is growing rapidly.67  Federal courts 
have assigned these cases to Multi-District- Litigation68.  Two widely publicized trials in State 
court have already been completed; Ernst v. Merck in Brazoria County, Texas, and Humeston v. 
Merck in Atlantic County Superior Court, New Jersey.  Analysts have estimated Merck’s 
potential liability exposure somewhere between four and thirty billion dollars.69
Robert Ernst, a 57 year-old marathon runner and Wal-Mart employee, died suddenly after 
taking Vioxx for eight months to ease pain in his hands.70  The medical examiner put in her 
autopsy report that Earnst died of an arrhythmia; 71 however, at trial, she stated the cause of death 
65 Id. 
66
 Mathews, supra note 40.
67
 David Brown, Journal Questions Data in Vioxx Study: 3 Heart Attacks Not Mentioned, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2005, 
at A2.
68
 The shareholder cases have been designated in New Jersey as MDL 1658 – In re Merck & Co., Inc., Securities, 
Derivative & “ERISA” Litigation; the product liability lawsuits have been designated MDL 1657 – In re VIOXX 
Product Liability Litigation.
69
 Associated Press, Newbury woman files Vioxx lawsuit, THE UNION LEADER (Manchester, NH) March 24, 2005, at 
B3.
70
 Nora L. Tooher, Vioxx Goes On Trial, LAWYERS WEEKLY, 2005 LWUSA 437, 460, Aug. 1, 2005 at 1, 24.
71
 Arrhythmias are disorders of the heart’s regular rhythmic beating.
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was a heart attack.  There is no medical or scientific evidence indicating that taking Vioxx is 
associated with arrhythmias.  In addition, the court allowed experts to testify from merely their 
own expertise and admitted the evidence on adverse CV events for 18 month use, while the 
plaintiff had only used the drug for eight.72 Despite the lack of evidence, on Aug 19, 2005, the 
jury delivered a $253.5 million dollar verdict against Merck in a 10-2 decision.73.  Texas law 
limits the amount of punitive damages that are recoverable to two million dollars.74  After caps 
on respective damages the total award will be reduced to $26 million.75  Following the verdict, 
interviews with the jurors revealed that the jurors apparently did not heavily weigh the evidence; 
they focused more on sending a message to drug companies regarding their deceptive acts.76
Following the Texas trial Merck released a statement on August 20, 2005, which argued
the verdict was not based on reliable science and that Merck continues to act in the best interests 
of their patients.77 The statement also made clear that Merck plans to continue its strategy of 
vigorously defending individual Vioxx lawsuits.78
Fortunately for Merck, the jury sided 8-1 with the company in the second publicized state 
court trial in Atlantic City Superior Court of New Jersey.79   In that case, Mike Humeston 
suffered a heart attack after taking 25mg of Vioxx for pain in his knee from an injury he had 
received during his U.S. Marine service.80  Because the cause of death was not in dispute, this 
case was arguably more indicative of a sample of the lawsuits filed.  However, since Mr. 
72
 Tooher, supra note 68.
73 Id.
74
 Heather Win Tesoriero, et al., Merck Loss Jolts Drug Giant, Industry, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2005, at A1.
75 Id.
76
 Kristen Hayes, Vioxx Jurors Sought to Send a Message, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 19, 2005), available at 
http://www.abcnews.go.com/US/LegalCenter/wireStory?id=1053407.
77
 Associated Press, Merck Wins New Jersey VIOXX® Product Case (Nov. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.vioxx.com/rofecoxib/vioxx/consumer/index.jsp.
78
 Barbara Martinez, Facing Vioxx Trials, Merck Pledges To Fight Each Case, WALL ST. J., April 22, 2005, at A1.
79
 Lisa Brennen, Merck Wins Big in New Jersey Vioxx Trial (Nov. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1131012312488.
80
 Associated Press, Major Victory for Merck in N.J. Trial (Nov. 3, 2005), available at
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9910674.
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Humeston had taken Vioxx for less than three months, it was difficult to relate any of the 
negative studies which have all been trials of at least nine months or longer.81 There has not 
been any negative short-term data collected, likely because the human body is very resilient to 
short-term, low-level toxicity.
CLINICAL RESEARCH
The research results have received different interpretations throughout both the medical 
and pharmaceutical field.  One interpretation of the epidemiological data suggests  a relationship 
between Vioxx and patients suffering adverse CV events. Others cite that the data is inaccurate
because the CV results were not collected as part of the study’s intended design. All CV data 
collected comes from secondary findings 82  from studies designed for a different purpose.  
However, plaintiffs will attempt to use these findings in order to imply that Merck had
knowledge of an increased risk of adverse CV outcomes. The use of these studies as admissible 
evidence will center on the reliability of the data, the intended design timeframe, and how long 
the patient took Vioxx.
ORIGINAL DATABASE
The original FDA safety database on Vioxx included approximately 5000 patients and 
did not show an increased risk of heart attack or stroke.83 The reliability of studies for examining
gastrointestinal (“GI”) adverse effects was generally limited.  Many studies were inadequately
powered to detect differences in frequency of separate adverse GI events.  Most studies 
81 Id.
82
 A secondary finding is additional data collected during a study’s intended timeframe regarding a category or class 
that was not part of the specific study design, but was collected contemporaneously with the clinical trial period.
83
 FDA, Vioxx Questions and Answers (created Sept. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/vioxx/vioxxQA.htm. (last visited Feb 10, 2006). See also, Epstein, supra
note 20.
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examined short term effect, which suggested that COX-II inhibitors are associated with a slightly 
lower risk of GI toxicity compared with NSAIDs.84
VIGOR
In March 2000, Merck funded a GI safety study entitled “Vioxx Gastrointestinal 
Outcomes Research” (“VIGOR”).85 The VIGOR trial was a double blind, randomized, stratified, 
parallel group trial of 8076 patients designed to compare the occurrence of GI toxicity with 
Vioxx 25mg and 50mg per day or naproxen86 1000mg per day during long term treatment for 
patients with rheumatoid arthritis.  Aspirin use was not permitted in the study. As a secondary 
finding, patients taking Vioxx had an overall increase in adverse CV events throughout the 18 
month study compared to placebo.  The study initially published in the New England Journal of 
Medicine showed Vioxx has a 4.25 times the relative risk of heart attack compared to naproxen. 
(Vioxx 17/2315 = 0.0073 vs. Naproxen 4/2316 = 0.0017).87  This study was submitted to the 
FDA.88 The additional data recently uncovered shows additional heart attacks which would 
increase the relative risk of Vioxx to five times that of patients taking naproxen (Vioxx 20/2698 
= 0.0074 vs. Naproxen 4/2699 = 0.00148).89 None of the adverse CV events in the study were 
fatal.90 In May 2000, after VIGOR publication, Merck’s top research and marketing executives 
declined to perform a more extensive study focused on Vioxx’s CV risks, arguing that the 
VIGOR data was unreliable.91
84
 Corinne de Vires, supra note 35.
85 Mukherjee, supra note 44.
86
 Naproxen is commonly known by trade name as Aleve.
87
 Claire Bombardier, et. al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxisity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients 
with Rheumatoid Arthritis, NEJM (2000), Issue 343, 1520-1528.
88 Id.  This data is depicted in tables on page 46.
89
 Curfman, supra note 63.
90 Id.
91
 Epstein, supra note 20.
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APPROVe
Subsequently, Merck undertook a different large, randomized trial of 2,586 patients in an 
attempt to expand the permissible uses of the drug approved to include treatment of colon 
polyps.92 The study, termed APPROVe, revealed that 3.6% of subjects taking Vioxx had adverse 
CV events compared to 2.0% in the placebo group.93 This data prompted Merck to voluntarily
remove the drug from the market.94 Removal of the drug also came from pressure of FDA 
scientists, such as David Graham, who interpreted the study to say Vioxx had caused between 
88,000 and 139,000 heart attacks.  Out of that number, he suggested that 40% of those were 
fatal.95
CLASS
Pfizer Inc. performed a six-month study comparing the cardiovascular effects of its drug 
Celebrex to Vioxx.96  The study was called CLASS (Celecoxib Arthritis Safety Study).97  The 
study found a decrease in GI complications by 10-20 per 1000, but an increase in adverse CV
events by 3 per 1000.98 In percentages, Vioxx decreased GI bleeding by 1-2% while increasing 
CV events by approximately 0.3% when compared to placebo.99 Patients showed a greater 
increase in hypertension rates100 with Vioxx than Celebrex when compared to placebo.101 The 
92
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placebo control data came lar gely from patient populations with substantial CV risk, which is 
why most were not given the COX-II’s in the first place.102
OTHER STUDIES
Other research revealed discrete clinical differences between the two COX-II inhibitors 
which suggest that the effect of the drugs on the cardiovascular system should be viewed 
separately rather than as a single class of drugs.103 Subsequent studies have also revealed a 
deficiency in what was originally believed to be one of the greatest benefits of the COX-II
inhibitors.  Scientists believed COX-II drugs were associated with a reduction in GI bleeding; 
however, that reduction  may have been grossly exaggerated. 104   A British study of two 
randomized controlled trials which followed patients for a year or more found that there was no 
significant difference in frequency of perforation, ulceration or bleeding between NSAIDs and 
the COX-II inhibitors rofecoxib or etodolac.105
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
The law of product liability has developed in tort through Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc.106 Strict liability was assigned to a manufacturer of a defective product on the 
market even though both privity of contract and notice of breach of warranty were lacking.107
Strict liability does not rest on a consensual foundation, but on one created by law.  In 
Greenman, the court held that no notice was needed for a breach of express warranty regarding
102 Id.
103
 University of Pennsylvania Health System Public Affairs, Penn Epidemiological Study Shows Difference in 
Cardiovascular events Between Vioxx and Celebrex (last visited Nov. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.upenn.edu/researchat penn/article.php?894&hlt.
104
 Corinne de Vires, supra note 35.
105 Id.
106 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 337 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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representations made in a brochure. 108 Thus, strict liability in tort for products was born 
judicially as a policy for the economic and social needs for consumer protection. This policy 
also alleviated some of the limitations in the negligence and warranty remedies.
Subsequently, the Greenman strict liability principle was incorporated in §402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts which has been adopted in the majority of jurisdictions.  Federal 
courts will apply state law to the claims because these claims fall under diversity jurisdiction.
The publication of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, drafters have been working on the Third
edition.  In 1998, a draft version of the Restatement (Third) of Torts was released which focuses 
on product liability in much greater detail, but its provisions are not yet officially enacted into 
state legislation.  Even though no state has adopted the specific provisions of the third edition, 
the courts use it as a guide to interpret existing law.
To establish a successful claim under §402A the plaintiff must establish, (1) the product 
had a defect, (2) the product was defective when it left the hands of defendant, and (3) that the 
product defect proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm.109 A product may be defective because 
of a defect in manufacture, design, or a failure to adequately warn the consumer of a hazard 
involved in the foreseeable use of the product.110
A defective condition is one not contemplated by the ultimate consumer which would be 
unreasonably dangerous to him. 111   A defective product is one that is “unreasonably 
dangerous.”112  This means it must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common 
108 Id.
109
 Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1965).
110 Id.
111
 Restatement (Second) of Torts, §402A(G)AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1965).
112
 §402A, supra note 109.
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to the community as to its characteristics.113  For example, sugar would not be not be considered 
unreasonably dangerous to a diabetic.
A defect in the manufacture of a product exists if the product differs from the 
manufacturer's intended design.114 The harmful incident a plaintiff suffers must be of a kind that 
ordinarily occurs as a result of a product defect.115  Common examples of manufacturing defects 
are products that are physically flawed, damaged, or incorrectly assembled.  The Vioxx litigation 
does not concern a “bad batch” or contaminated product associated with a manufacturing type of 
defect.  Here, claims for product defect include defective design and defective warning.
The essential elements of a claim based upon an alleged design defect are: the defendant 
was the manufacturer or supplier of a product; the product was defective in design; the defect in 
design existed when it left the defendant's possession; the defect in design was a cause of injury 
to the plaintiff; and the plaintiff's injury resulted from a use of the product that was reasonably 
foreseeable by the defendant. 116 Different jurisdictions, and even inconsistencies within a 
jurisdiction, use two common tests to determine whether a product is defective in design.
A product has a defective warning if the use of the product in a manner that is reasonably 
foreseeable by the seller involves a substantial danger that would not be readily recognized by 
the ordinary user of the product and the manufacturer knows or should have known of the 
danger, but fails to give any or adequate warning of such danger.117  The duty to provide 
adequate warning to the user extends to those risks which are known or knowable in light of the 
113
 §402A(i), supra note 109; see also, Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp, 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
114 Id.
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generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge at the time of 
manufacture and distribution.118
Specific attention is directed toward prescription drugs in products liability law.  
Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A, comment k (“comment k”) takes special notice of 
unavoidably unsafe products and recognizes that because of the high social utility, some products 
are incapable of being made safe for intended and ordinary use.119
A manufacturer may also be liable in tort under other theories of recovery.  Those related 
to the Vioxx litigation include misrepresentation or fraud, and breach of express or implied 
warranty.  We will now explore each of these theories, their strengths and weaknesses, as applied
to the Vioxx litigation.
There is no question that Vioxx is a product.120  In addition, there is no dispute as to 
whether Merck is in the business of selling or otherwise distributing.  And since Merck is the 
sole manufacturer of Vioxx, we will assume that the consumers were actually given the drug 
distributed by the sole manufacturer.  There is no question Merck manufactured, designed, 
packaged, marketed, sold or distributed Vioxx.  There will also be an assumption each user took 
their medication as directed by their prescribing physician.
118 Id. 
119
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ADMISSIBILITY OF CLINICAL RESEARCH
Merck consistently argues that the studies are unreliable due to their design.  Reliability 
is a relative term.  Something can be highly reliable or it may only be vaguely reliable.  What are 
the factors that show us whether it is reliable enough to give to the jury?
This revisits one of the greatest disconnects between law and medicine.  Just as you 
would not want your medical malpractice attorney practicing medicine on you, most Judges are 
not medically literate enough to understand the reliability of these scientific studies.  This is the 
same reason physicians argue for medical courts overseen by a panel of physicians similar to 
specialized courts in other areas such as bankruptcy.121
If it is so difficult to understand whether the research is reliable, one suggestion is to let 
the jury decide.  However, having unsophisticated juries decide whether the data is reliable, 
which experts on both sides contradict, does not alleviate any problems and effectively allows 
plaintiffs to play the courtroom lottery.  In the cases already tried to verdict, allowing for the 
introduction of this evidence has only produced what could be expected, inconsistent results that 
do not properly instruct the market on how to act or the company to insure against.  This has 
been a result of differing rules and interpretations in diverse jurisdiction.  Some state courts 
differently interpret or do not apply the principles laid out in the Daubert Trilogy, which is 
followed in a majority of jurisdictions.122
All clinical data that parties wish to introduce will undergo a Daubert hearing on 
admissibility as the court operates in its “gate-keeping” function. 123   The admissibility of 
evidence will likely have different outcomes that varies depending on where a case was filed.  
121
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The state and federal rules of evidence often differ drastically. 124 An expert may rely on 
information that is not itself admissible.125  It would not seem difficult then to be able to find 
experts willing to use some or all of the studies, in addition to their own medical experience126 to 
formulate an opinion that Vioxx caused patients taking it to have a heart attack or stroke.
Under the older Frye test,127 evidence of scientific theory or technique is inadmissible 
unless it has gained the general acceptance in the community or the particular field to which it 
belongs.  Under the current Daubert standard, the trial court judge needs to make sure that 
scientific testimony or other specialized knowledge is relevant and reliable. 128   In order to 
determine reliability of the evidence the judge may consider: whether the theory can and has 
been tested; whether it has been subject to peer review; whether the theory or methodology 
employed is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community; and the known or expected 
rate of error.129
The difficulty with the Vioxx data is the expected rates of error of secondary findings and 
the acceptance of those in the scientific community.  The gold standard130 in the scientific 
community for a reliable epidemiological study is a double blind placebo controlled study 
designed to study a certain effect. The research showing increased CV would also have to 
correlate to the milligrams taken by the patient.  If the study used patients taking Vioxx at 50mg
and the injured patient only used Vioxx at 25mg, the correlation between the two would not be 
124 FED. EVID. R. 703 (2005).
125 Id.  See also, FED EVID. R. 702 (2005).
126 Khumo Tire, supra note 114.  Expert testimony based solely on the experience of the expert with out more would 
not be admissible.
127 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. App. 1926).
128 Daubert, supra note 122.
129
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scientifically reliable.  The VIGOR study followed patients for 18 months so it would not be on 
point for those who took Vioxx for a lesser time period.  
Further, Merck argued that Vioxx itself did not cause the heart attacks but that Naproxen 
was somehow preventing them, which makes the two products dissimilar comparisons in head-
to-head trials.131 The CLASS study was the only one designed to study CV events.  In the 
publication of the CLASS findings comparing CV effects of Vioxx to Celebrex, the author 
disclaims the reliability of the data comparing Vioxx to placebo because it is a secondary 
finding. 132  The other research also discovered CV risk only through secondary findings.
Plaintiffs have also pointed to a study conducted in 1998 that had secondary results indicating 
Vioxx caused heart problems in dogs, but this may not show a similar reaction in humans.
It appears that each piece of evidence individually should not pass Daubert standards.  
However, judges may decide after reviewing the studies that collectively they are reliable enough 
to be admissible.
THE COX-II DESIGN
For most products, there are two common assessments to determine if a product is
defective in design. Under the first test, called the Consumer-Expectation-Test, a product is 
defective in design if it fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when 
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.133 This is the impression reasonably 
received by a consumer through representations or other communications made to him about the 
131
 Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration Center for Drug Evaluation and 
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product through various means such as: advertising, appearance of product, or other ways in 
which product projects an image on the mind of the consumer, including impressions created by 
widespread social agreement about the products function.134
It is quite easy to satisfy this test because often this is the sole purpose of filing the 
litigation in the first place.  Here, users would argue that after taking the appropriately prescribed 
amount to cure their pain they suffered a heart attack.  No ordinary person would expect to  have 
a heart attack as a result from taking their pain medication.  However, ordinary patients do 
expect drugs to have at least some side effects.
The second and most prominent test is the Risk-Utility-Test which determines if there is a 
risk of danger inherent in the design which outweighs the benefits of that design.135 When 
making this determination, the trier of fact considers: the gravity of the danger posed by the 
design; the frequency of harm; the likelihood that such danger would cause damage, the 
mechanical feasibility of a safer alternate design at the time of manufacture, the financial cost of 
an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and the consumer that would 
result from an alternate design.136
Here, the danger of heart attack or stroke is extremely grave, but according to the studies 
the frequency of these events is only marginally increased compared to naproxen (0.17% to 
0.73%).137 The likelihood is different depending on how high a CV risk the patient had to begin 
with.  The only properly designed CV effect study only compared the drug to Celebrex.  This 
may indicate the feasibility of a safer design, but no one understands how or why.  Different 
people weighing these factors may place different emphasis on what they believe to be important 
134 Id.  See also, Brown v. Raymond Corp. 432 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2005).
135
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factors.  It appears relatively clear that medical science hasn’t evolved enough to understand just 
how the COX enzymes work.  It would be difficult to argue with any medical certainty since 
scientists do not understand exactly how Celebrex and Vioxx differ from each other besides their 
chemical structures.  Because of this ambiguity, it would seem for now that after weighing the 
factors under this test, the purported benefits of the drug outweigh the risk; thus, no design 
defect.
However, neither traditional risk verses benefit nor consumer expectation analyses apply 
in the majority of jurisdictions for prescription drugs.138 The majority of jurisdictions follow the 
holding in Brown v. Superior Court, whereby pharmaceutical drugs are automatically analyzed 
using comment k. 139 There is no requirement that the drug be determined unavoidably 
dangerous in order to be measured by comment k.140 The test provides that when a drug does not 
provide any net benefits to any class of patients or when reasonable, informed health-care 
providers would not prescribe it to any class of patients, then the design of the product is 
defective and the manufacturer should be subject to liability for harm caused.141  The issue is 
whether, objectively viewed, reasonable providers, knowing the foreseeable risks and benefits of 
the drug, would prescribe it for any class of patient.142 The majority follow this test because the
foreseeability of risk of harm is more complex in the case of prescription drugs.143
138 Brown v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 1061 751 P.2d at 477, 478 (Cal. 1998)  
overruling Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories,  (1985) This effectively changed the analysis for prescription drugs where 
the judge no longer must first ascertain if product falls under unavoidably dangerous exception.  The court in Brown
court noted that the test adopted in Kearl was too confusing because of its analysis between useful and harmful 
drugs which lead to inconsistent conclusions about the same drug. 
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Prescription drugs are necessary to alleviate pain and suffering or to sustain life.  They 
are distinct from other products, such as construction machinery, which are used to make work 
easier or provide pleasure.144  The delay involved in withholding a drug from the market until 
scientific skill and knowledge advanced to the point at which additional dangerous side effects 
would be revealed, when added to the delay required for approval from the FDA, would not 
serve the public welfare.145
The comment k test is the most difficult test to prove.  After Merck removed Vioxx from 
the market, patients complained that it was the only drug effective to help them with pain 
management. Patients cited that if there was an associated CV risk they had an open willingness 
to confront it.146 The drug still provides great benefits to the entire classes taking the drug, 
although providing less of a benefit for those with high CV risk.  Doctors still prescribed the 
drug after the research and editorials were published in medical literature.  Also, there is no 
research which indicates increased CV risk for short-term use.  However, if Merck 
representatives had not downplayed the risk associated with Vioxx, physicians may have not 
prescribed the drug because of the wide range of available alternatives.  Even assuming Vioxx 
was not intended to be prescribed to some classes, the data does not indicate that if Vioxx does 
cause heart attacks it would not benefit any class at all.
144 Brown, supra note 138.
145 Id.  There is an underlying assumption that the reference to serious side effects is applied with restraint.  
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DID MERCK PROVIDE ADEQUATE WARNING?
The issue of warning is acute in drug cases because of the extensive federal regulation of 
warnings.147 The majority of courts also follow comment k when determining whether the 
manufacturer provided an adequate warning.148  One cited reason is that in the case of new or 
experimental drugs there can often be no assurance of safety or purity.149 The comment k rule is 
that manufacturers are not strictly liable for injuries caused by a prescription drug so long as the 
drug was properly prepared and accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities that 
were either known or reasonably scientifically knowledgeable at the time of distribution.150 If a 
manufacturer satisfies those elements the product is considered not defective or unreasonably 
dangerous.151 The burden is on the plaintiff to prove by preponderance that adequate warnings 
were not provided.152  The adequacy and sufficiency of the manufacturers warning is determined 
under the objective reasonableness standard. 153   The question becomes would a reasonable 
person in the same or similar circumstances have been adequately warned.
Putting a warning on a product may increase the manufacturer’s exposure to liability 
because the manufacturer may not then say it did not owe the consumer a duty to warn.154  By 
not placing a warning on a product, the issue becomes a question of fact for jury of whether 
Merck owed a duty to the consumer.  However since all prescription drugs require warnings,
Merck may not follow this logic.155
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LEARNED INTERMEDIARIES
A manufacturer may be excused from warning each user if it properly warns the 
prescribing physician of the medication’s dangers.156  In this case, Merck engaged in direct-to-
consumer marketing which may also require the company to adequately directly warn consumers.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts has left this issue to developing case law, depending on 
whether a state’s products liability law legislates the boundaries of the learned intermediary 
doctrine.157  One court has determined that factors to consider include the amount spent on 
advertising and how aggressive the company was in advertising to the public.158 Other courts 
have held that if the advertisements inform patients to consult with a physician, then the doctrine 
applies.159
For the majority, comment k limits the duty of drug manufacturers to only provide 
adequate warnings to learned intermediaries.160  Strict liability applies when prescription drug 
manufacturers fail to adequately warn physicians of the dangers associated with its product.161
Under normal circumstances, prescribing health care providers are in the best position to reduce 
risks of harm to a patient in accordance with instructions or warnings.162  Those professionals 
know what type of patient they are giving the prescription to, what types of risks that person 
carries, what other medicines they are taking, what other ailments they have, and minimally 
assess the level of sophistication of the patient’s capability to use the product correctly. 
156 Porterfield v. Ethicon, Inc. 183 F.3d 464, 467, 468 (5th Cir. 1999).
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The learned intermediary doctrine does not necessarily bar all failure to warn claims
against drug manufacturers.  It does not shield drug manufacturers from liability if the warnings 
they provided to physicians do not permit the physicians to adequately advise their patients.163
Pharmaceutical companies and their representatives must reasonably instruct doctors of 
the dangers of their product. “Dear Doctor” letters, which warn doctors of newly discovered risks 
or side effects of a product, have been held to be an inadequate way to appropriately warn.164
Merck issued one of these letters in April 2002 informing doctors of the marketing and labeling 
changed to address the VIGOR study.165
What Merck arguably failed to do was adequately represent the findings of the study to 
physicians.  This applies to the case of an injured patient relying on the warnings conveyed to 
him through his doctor about Vioxx.  Patients often visit a doctor’s office, request medication, 
and must completely rely on the physician’s statements.  The learned intermediary doctrine does 
not preclude the plaintiffs from seeking damages, because Merck sales representatives made 
representations regarding the safety and efficacy of its product which were not true.  According 
to the FDA warning letter, Merck’s representatives allegedly were not appropriately warning
physicians about the seriousness of the CV risk. However, if the data was unreliable as Merck 
believed and still believes it to be, then they did not fail to warn the doctors.
STATE OF THE ART KNOWLEDGE
A product manufacturer is not strictly liable for failure to warn of dangers that the 
manufacturer neither knew nor could have known given the state of the art knowledge at the time 
163 In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio).
164 Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
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the product was manufactured.166 The manufacturer’s duty is confined to a situation in which the 
seller has knowledge or should have known of the danger.167  Therefore, a manufacturer has no 
duty to warn of unknown risks.  Termed the “state of the art defense,” it is not an affirmative 
defense because it relates to one of the fundamental elements of the claim. The court in Brown
and the Restatement (Third) of Torts have adopted Professor Wade’s view that a manufacturer’s 
actual or constructive knowledge should be measured from the time the drug is distributed.168
However, there is still a small minority of jurisdictions that reject this view and measure actual 
or constructive knowledge known at the time of trial.169 When courts follow the later approach,
an unavoidable risk on manufacturers is created because one cannot insure against an 
unknowable risk.
Once evidence is introduced by plaintiffs that the defendant knew or should have know of 
the danger, then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that information was not reasonably 
obtainable or available and that the defendant lacked constructive knowledge.  Constructive 
knowledge is knowledge which is obtainable by the application of reasonable, developed human 
skill and foresight.170 The burden on the defendant is a matter of policy since it was the 
defendant who released the product into the stream of commerce.  
Many courts find that if a risk is beginning to be known and there is a difference in 
opinion, but the manufacturer reasonably decides not to warn consumers and harm still occurs,
166§402A, supra note 102, at comment j.  A manufacturer’s duty is continued to warn to a situation in which the 
seller has knowledge or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have 
knowledge of the danger.
167 Id. 
168 Brown, supra note 138, citing Wade, The Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to 
Marketing, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 734, 753, 754 (1983); see also, §2, supra note 143, at comment i.  The basic duty to 
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then the product is unreasonably dangerous.171  This is because knowable harm can be avoided 
through reasonable diligence in discovering the risk. For Vioxx, it is questionable when 
anything became knowable or even if it ever has.  Because the results of the studies are 
secondary findings, a question arises as to whether pharmaceutical companies must research 
every potentially harmful yet unreliable finding that is produced.  The answer is of course not; 
however, the data’s reliability increases when it continues to yield the same results.
One reason Merck did not perform additional studies specifically designed toward CV 
safety is that conducting an additional or specific study indicates that the manufacturer believes 
there is a problem with their product.172 The company argues that it did test for CV safety before 
the drug went to market.173  If the results were detrimental they would surely be used against 
them.  Physicians and patients would not widely use a product that is under review by the 
manufacturer for causing heart attacks and strokes.  It was financially not in their best interest.  
This reason is in addition to the obvious one that if a risk did exist it would not be in the 
shareholder’s interest to find out.  Plaintiffs will say that Merck continued to deny the ill health 
effects associated with Vioxx while at the same time reaping profits obtained through non-
disclosure and concealment.  
In addition to the duty to warn at the time of sale, many states require manufacturers to 
fulfill a post-sale duty to warn of dangers when they become aware of new risks and should 
reasonably warn the users.174 As may happen with any new drug product, serious side effects 
associated with analgesics may become evident only after approval and widespread use. Even 
though Merck may not have known or have been able to know of CV risks at the drug’s 
171 Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991).
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inception, the company must warn users if they subsequently find out or should have found out 
patients are suffering heart attacks from use of Vioxx.  Merck has warned post sale.  After 
receiving the FDA warning letter in 2002, Merck changed Vioxx’s labeling to include findings
of the VIGOR study results as well as precautions against hypertension and those patients with 
CV risk.175
At some point between the drug’s inception at Merck’s labs and when the product was 
removed, the company believed the concern was great enough to remove the drug from market.  
It would obviously take a large concern to remove a drug which generated $2.3 billion a year 
from the market. Plaintiffs will try to use this to impeach Merck’s credibility and play to juror’s 
emotions by stating that the publicly-traded corporation has loyalty only to its shareholders.  
They can argue that Merck ignored the possible increased CV risk and continuing to market its 
product only to later find subsequent studies only supported the conclusion that the risk exists.
Merck will argue that at no point has there been enough reliable data showing increased CV risk.  
As Merck saw it, the weight of the imperfect studies eventually shifted the weight of the 
unreliable studies to give an indication that the reoccurrence of the secondary results were not 
merely random chance.
Merck representatives argued that the VIGOR study showing increased heart attack and 
stroke risk was flawed because the data was a secondary finding of a study directed for another 
purpose.  If this is true, then why did Merck voluntary remove the product from the market after 
their own study indicated the increase risk also as a secondary finding?  Why was Merck’s study 
reliable enough to take Vioxx off the market and others were not?   
One idea is that Merck decided that their own study made the weight of all available data 
reach a evidentiary threshold that they should be aware that there may be a CV problem.  It
175
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would not matter that Merck’s own study was not a study designed for CV effects, merely that 
the weight of several imperfect studies have reached a level to indicate a probable outcome.  
Also, Merck’s study was conducted with a large population which also increased the reliability 
of any secondary finding. Again the issue rests on the reliability and admissibility of these 
studies, which is later discussed in further detail.
HEEDING PRESUMPTION
In order for an injured party to recover, the patient would have had to read and followed 
any additional warning.  Assuming the warning was inadequate, discerning whether someone 
would have still taken Vioxx if given the proper warning is difficult to do.  This is especially true 
if the patient died as a result of taking the medication.  It is not appropriate to view this 
retrospectively because it is obvious that if the patient knew they were going to die they never 
would have taken the drug.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes this quandary into 
consideration and presumes that the consumer heeded the warning.176  Evidence may be offered 
to rebut such testimony, which is often done at trial.  
This is effectively accomplished by impeaching someone for smoking despite strong 
labeling or taking other prescriptions with similar or more significant risks.  Also, the warning 
was changed in 2002 to incorporate the concerns of the VIGOR study.  If the claimant took the 
drug after 2002 and read the warning, then they would have already taken the drug with some 
warning of CV risks even if the VIGOR data was underrepresented.  If the patient never read the 
product insert, then it shows the probability of them heeding the warning is highly unlikely.
176
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EXPRESS WARRANTY
Breach of express warranty occurs when products fail to conform to a promise made by a 
seller to the buyer regarding statements (oral or written) at or before time of sale.177  The 
statements may be packaged with the goods at time of sale or even directed to the public at 
large.178 The representation from the seller must become some basis of the bargain; in other 
words, the buyer must rely upon the seller’s statements.179
The proposed amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) specifically attend 
to information provided in packaging and advertising, holding those responsible for such 
statements to conform to the affirmations of fact within.180
After 2002, the Vioxx package insert warned of CV risks.181 If the product was taken 
between 1999 and 2002, then there may be some type of implication that the drug is safe.  
However, because there were no affirmative representations, it does not amount to a promise.
Any statements given during Merck’s multi-million dollar a year advertising campaign likely did 
not warn of CV effects.  Again, as long as the there were not any affirmative statements in the 
ads regarding CV risk then they are not express warranties.
It appears from the FDA warning letter directed to Merck that their sales representatives 
were making express warranties about the product that were not true.  Those representatives 
during presentations not only downplayed VIGOR results, they also stated the drug was safe for 
other uses which were not FDA approved and the CV safety of the drug was perfectly fine.
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Although medical professionals had access to the same studies published in the journals, it is not 
the standard of care for them to be current with nonstandard practices.
From the known facts, Merck’s representatives did not make any express warranty that
adverse CV events would never result from use of Vioxx.  Any representation that the drug was 
CV safe is still correct because if adverse CV events do occur it effects such a small percent of 
the population.
IMPLIED WARRANTY
There is a general societal assumption that a product is safe and effective when it is put 
on the market.  Vioxx was approved for the earlier stated uses and is assumed fit for those 
purposes.  A product must be reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which it is used.182
The advertisements to the public and promotion to physicians were an implicit indication 
that the drug was safe and effective for its intended uses. In this case, one would expect when 
ingesting Vioxx that it would be effective in relieving pain; a drug that caused patients to have
heart attacks would not be fit for much of anything.  However, comment k specifically addresses 
this issue in prescription drug cases stating that adverse reactions are unavoidable in prescription 
drugs. 183   Not everyone that took Vioxx suffered an adverse CV event; only 0.73% of 
participants using Vioxx did during the VIGOR study.  Since adverse CV events occur in such a 
small minority of users it would seem that Vioxx would not be unfit for its intended purpose.
Another implied warranty may be made regarding the heavy marketing of COX-II 
inhibitors as reducing stomach bleeding. Some of the new studies show that this is not true, and 
if any GI benefit is associated it is marginal at best.  This may have induced some patients with 
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higher risk for GI bleeding to use this medication when the risk of traditional NSAIDs was too 
great.  This would only concern those plaintiffs who suffered GI injury.  They would not have to 
prove they would not have had a GI injury from another NSAID because they likely would not 
have taken any COX drug at all because of their risk. It would not matter when or if Merck 
knew that the drug did not provide this benefit.  It merely matters that the drug did not conform 
to the implied representation.  However, there is no reliable information to this effect and both 
the original and updated package insert expressly warns of an associated GI risk.
MISREPRESENTATION
Returning to the FDA warning letter, Merck should not have been as careless in 
downplaying the CV dangers of Vioxx.  The sales representatives allegedly continued to market 
Vioxx by downplaying the risk.  Misrepresentation184  occurs when the seller makes a fraudulent, 
negligent, or innocent misrepresentation of material fact concerning the character or quality of its 
product which caused justifiable reliance and someone is physically harmed as a result of that 
misrepresentation.185 Those responsible are strictly liable in tort without proving any actual 
defect in the product.186 Did Merck know or should it have known otherwise when making their 
statements?
According to the FDA warning letter, Merck sales representatives misinformed 
physicians about the proven abilities of the drug in addition to downplaying any CV risk. The 
letter stated, “Additionally, your claim in the press release that Vioxx has a ‘favorable 
cardiovascular safety profile,’ is simply incomprehensible, given the rate of MI and serious CV 
184
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events compared to naproxen.”187  If such allegations are true, physicians were likely induced to
prescribe Vioxx to patients.  The patients then justifiably relied on the advice of their prescribing 
physician to take the medication. However, the statements Merck’s sales representatives must 
actually be false or substantially misleading.  Merck would only be able to make representations 
on the safety of their product if they had reliable data which did not show an increase in CV 
events, but Merck argues that they did test CV safety prior to the drug’s approval.188
The scientists clearly knew data was omitted when submitted to the FDA.  Merck will 
argue it is not a misrepresentation.  The study was not designed or promoted to show CV effects.  
In addition the data left out was given to editors after they wrote the article, but before it was 
submitted to the FDA.  The additional data was taken outside the timeframe of the study design.  
Scientists often continue to collect data for additional months so that it may show a reason to 
design a study for a longer length.  Since the patients that are studied do not all start and stop on 
the same date, researchers are often still studying a patient past the studies timeframe while 
others have not yet finished.  This is where the extra data has come from.
The FDA warning letter issued to Merck informed them that their sales representatives 
were bolstering the ability and effectiveness of Vioxx for unapproved uses and downplaying the 
drug’s associated risks.  If sales representatives were affirmatively representing that the drug was 
perfectly cardiovascularly safe, the representatives would not have exercised reasonable care in 
the accuracy of any data they gave.  There is no reliable data either way.  Just because there is no 
reliable data saying Vioxx causes heart attacks does not mean company representatives can 
misrepresent that the drug does not without evidence.  However, it would hardly promote 
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justifiable reliance because the data only changed the CV risk from 4.25 to five times placebo.189
This only showed a slightly greater statistical, but no true clinical, difference.  The data on the 
disk merely will be usable for Merck’s credibility, making the company appear to be covering up 
other data because they did not show the three additional CV events in the additional 383 persons 
studied outside of the study’s timeframe. Any argument that when Merck’s scientists made 
additional public statements and published articles that it believed its product was safe and that 
the data showing otherwise was a misrepresentation is incorrect.
CAUSATION
Another fundamental element to a successful products liability claim is causation.  The 
damages must be a proximate result from a defect or failure to warn.  Causation is the causal 
connection between a defective product and the user’s harm.190 Causation in fact occurs when 
but for the defect or failure to give adequate warning the harm would not have occurred.191 The 
defect must also be the producing cause of the harm which is the extent that public policy allows 
liability to extend.192 In analyzing one must find that the product could actually cause this type 
of injury; and if so, whether the product caused that type of harm in this situation. It is often 
necessary for an injured party to produce expert testimony to prove the specific cause of the 
injuries.
In the case of Vioxx, a plaintiff must show a casual nexus between taking Vioxx and the 
adverse CV event the plaintiff suffered.  Epidemiological studies, case reports of injuries, animal 
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studies, and FDA statements, if admissible, may be used as evidence to this effect.193  One alone 
may not satisfy the plaintiff’s burden, but it may be satisfied collectively.194
Because the plaintiffs have the burden of proof for causation, without it Merck will 
obtain summary judgment or directed verdict.  This element is often easily satisfied where 
patients suffer from signature diseases.  In those cases it is more obvious why a patient is 
suffering from such disease.  
Because there are no studies or other evidence linking Vioxx to anaphylactic shock, 
summary judgment was granted to Merck in one Ohio case where the plaintiff died from sudden 
anaphylactic shock after taking samples of Vioxx.195  The ruling was upheld on the issue that 
there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s death was cased by the lack of warnings.196
The problem with these Vioxx cases is different; here, the injury that is produced, adverse 
CV events, are normally occurring phenomena. With the current science, we are medically 
incapable of making an exact determination whether a CV event was caused by Vioxx or another
contributing factor(s).  So while there may arguably be an increase in occurrence, a 
determination as to which CV events were natural and which were due to Vioxx are beyond
medical science.  There is no medically discoverable difference between someone who dies of a 
Vioxx heart attack or stroke and someone who dies from one due to other causes.
Additionally, the epidemiological studies indicate the injury only affects a small 
percentage or fractional percentage of the users.  Merck’s experts will point to plaintiff’s medical 
records and any indication of other factors which may have contributed to an adverse CV event.  
There are dozens of contributing factors to one suffering an adverse CV event; stress in a 
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patient’s work and family life or whether they drink coffee or other caffeinated beverages could 
have contributed to heart problems.
Expert testimony does not meet the plaintiff’s burden by merely stating problem X causes 
Y effect.  In order for there to be sufficient causation evidence they must say Y effect here 
occurred as a result of X problem.  The plaintiff’s expert will have difficulties ruling out other 
possibilities on cross-examination, but if proper testimony was elicited then the issue will go to 
jury.  
The adverse CV effect alleged in Vioxx litigation appears strikingly similar to the 
ephedra litigation.  In those cases, plaintiffs alleged that ephedra caused increased heart attacks 
and strokes.197 However, there was no scientific evidence as to what caused any individual heart 
attack.  The only evidence was that overall there is an increased incidence of these CV events.198
The most noteworthy irregularity between Vioxx trials will be whether the jurisdiction 
advocates the application of probability theory of proof process.199  Aside from the differences in 
conceptual and analytic application, fundamental arguments surround whether courts should use 
(1) probabilistic techniques to determine the likelihood of the facts supporting a defendant’s guilt 
or liability and (2) whether or not the plaintiff’s burden is satisfied when that probability exceeds 
a threshold value.200  Individual judges also have different interpretations on the relationship 
between probability and proof.  Each judge carries his or her own personal views on whether 
integrating mathematics into the fact-finding process of a legal trial outweigh the benefits.
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Proponents of probabilistic decision-making believe that statistics may be used to meet 
the preponderance of the evidence standard employed in civil litigation.201  The standard is the 
burden of demonstrating that the likelihood of the defendant’s liability is greater than the 
likelihood of his innocence; in other terms the probability supporting the defendant’s liability 
exceeds 0.5 or 50%.202  Generally, probability of a given outcome in some activity is calculated 
by measuring the frequency with which that outcome occurs.203  Alone, the frequency rate of 
injury is insufficient to determine the probability of causation that Vioxx was more likely than 
not to have caused the plaintiff’s heart attack. 204   In order to illustrate this common 
misapplication, consider the hypothetical case of a High School baseball game where 1000 
people come to view the game.205 If 499 people pay the $3 for a ticket and the other 501 attend 
by gate-crashing, then in a legal action against any one spectator according to the 0.501 
probability, the action would be successful against any spectator.206
There is continuing theoretical debate on whether to find some defendants liable for those 
torts which they did not commit or having individual plaintiffs fail to recover for actual harm.207
The answer is often different depending on the goal or the court in a particular case, i.e. to deter 
conduct or allow companies to insure against ascertainable loss. Some theorists even suggest 
allowing discounted recoveries to reflect scientific uncertainty.208
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A bare probability should lead the legal system to decline to act by holding for the 
defendant.209  In Smith v. Rapid Transit the court held, “merely that mathematically the chances 
are in favor of a proposition is not enough to establish it by a preponderance of the evidence; 
there must be actual belief from evidence that the proposition is more probably true.” 210  The 
scientific data alone is not sufficient for a directed verdict or summary judgment, and no matter 
how strong the data is in either direction, it must be submitted to the trier of fact to make the 
determination of liability.  Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe has argued in support of the 
actual belief requirement stating, “Moral qualms about imposing civil liability under conditions 
of uncertainty should respond to the actual risk of verdict error, not its overtness.”211  “Because 
people readily perceive the risk of verdict error, they become uneasy if the legal system relies on 
such evidence to change the status quo by holding for the plaintiff.”212
In addition to the flawed nature of the statistical theories, courts are often guilty of 
misapplication of statistics.213  The risk ratio, also known as relative risk, may be defined as the 
risk of disease in a population segment exposed to a particular substance, divided by the risk of 
the disease in the rest of the population.214  The risk ratio represents how much more likely an 
exposed person is to contract the disease than an unexposed person.215  A comparison is made 
209
 Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 530 (1989).
210
 Smith v. Rapid Transit, 58 N.E. 2d 754 (Mass. 1945) In Smith, a bus forced the plaintiff off the road and into a 
parked car.  Evidence that the sole owner and operator of all public buses on a particular street, absent any other 
evidence, was insufficient for a directed verdict that the defendant actually was the owner of the bus.  The court 
found that the bus could have been operated by a private or charter carrier in the city.  The infamous blue bus 
hypothetical which evolved from the case is slightly different, which reads as follows: a woman is hit by a bus 
crossing the street, in a wrongful death action against the bussing company the only evidence presented is that 80% 
of all blue busses in that city are owned and operated by the defendant. Is this evidence alone sufficient to prove the 
defendant’s liability? See also, Porter Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Company, 29 N.E.2d 825 (Mass. 1940).
211
 Shaviro, supra note 209.
212 Id.
213
 Greenland and Robins, supra note 201.
214 Id.  ((Number of persons* with heart attacks taking Vioxx / total number of people taking Vioxx) / (Number of 
persons not taking Vioxx with heart attacks / total number of people not taking Vioxx)).  *Number of persons = 
persons in the study.
215 Id.
43
between the proportion of persons with the disease in a group of people exposed versus the 
proportion of persons with the disease in the group not exposed.  The risk ratio does not equal or 
even approximate the probability of causation.216  There is a clear distinction between the excess 
incidence caused by an exposure (attributable fraction) and the probability that the exposure 
caused an individual’s disease (the “probability of causation”).217  Many epidemiologists and 
health physicists serving as expert consultants and witnesses continue to equate attributable 
fractions with the probability of causation.218
In epidemiology, risk is quantitative.  Due to generalized error rates from sample size, 
study bias, and error due to chance, resulting data simply represents a close approximation of the 
actual risk.219   The subjective probability derived by a legal fact-finder is more accurately 
described as an estimate based on a sample of information rather than a true value derived from 
an analysis of all possible information.220  Risk ratios less than three can be generated entirely by 
factors such as study bias and lack of precision. 221   A large risk ratio signifies a strong 
association, which is highly indicative, although not determinative, of a casual relationship.  
Some courts have viewed risk ratios greater than one as capable of proving causation.222  In 
Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,223 testimony based on an epidemiological study 
with a risk ration between 1.3 and 1.8 and other data was found to be sufficient.224  Although any 
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risk ration greater than one logically would support the notion of a casual relationship, any risk 
ration less than three generally indicates a weak association.225
One oversight with this measurement is the fact that the risk is viewed in statistical 
differences; in other words, it fails to address true clinical differences.  For example, a scientific 
study revealing that there is a clear increase in the number of patients acquiring a particular 
disease is attributable to a certain drug, but where the particular disease affects a significant 
population of people.  Note that the more common the disease, the lower the risk ratio (i.e. the 
increase in denominator value).  Analogically speaking, five pebbles in an empty bucket looks 
much different than adding five to an already half-full bucket even though the increase was the 
same.
DEFENSES
Assuming that a plaintiff was able to bring a successful claim against the manufacturer, 
those seeking recovery would still have face any affirmative defenses.  Comparative fault is a 
defense to strict liability. 226  It is negligence on the part of a plaintiff which combining with the 
product defect or failure to warn contributes as a cause in bringing about the injury. 227
Comparative fault on the part of plaintiff does not bar recovery by the plaintiff against the 
defendant, but the total amount of damages to which plaintiff would otherwise be entitled shall 
be reduced by the percentage that plaintiff's comparative fault contributed as a cause to plaintiff's 
injury.228
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The facts in the case of Vioxx assume Merck will not be able to use comparative fault if 
its product was properly taken as prescribed.  Any other outside medical factors which may have 
contributed to the heart attack are relevant to proving causation and not comparative fault.  These 
are outside factors that do not amount to negligence on the part of the user. 
OUTLOOK
It appears that plaintiffs will encounter significant obstacles to their claims.  There are no 
solid portions to any part of the claims.  The largest hurdle to any claim is the reliability of the 
scientific studies and expert testimony.  Again, that will largely depend on what jurisdiction or 
whether the case is in federal or state court.  The issue of causation here is almost impossible to 
prove, but if the plaintiffs survive summary judgment, then statistically if enough cases are tried 
some will be successful.  For future litigation, plaintiffs in federal court will also confront the 
requirement of a unanimous verdict.
These cases appear to be duds, but that is not stopping plaintiffs from attempting to reap 
the large judgments of the few winnable cases.  If Merck is successful in defending say 90% of 
their lawsuits, but they are mostly tried, the company will have to face financial difficulties.  The 
cost of defending some suits may cost more than settling. The few cases that win will surely be 
enough to fuel the well organized plaintiff’s bar to continue in the fight since the likely payouts 
would be significant.
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